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Abstract
We analyse the risk-taking behaviour of heterogenous intermediaries that are pro-
tected by limited liability and choose both their amount of leverage and the risk expo-
sure of their portfolio. Due to the opacity of the nancial sector, outside providers of
funds cannot distinguish prudent intermediaries from those imprudentones that
voluntarily hold high-risk portfolios and expose themselves to the risk of bankrupcy.
We show how the number of imprudent intermediaries is determined in equilibrium
jointly with the interest rate, and how both ultimately depend on the cross-sectional
distribution of intermediariescapital. One implication of our analysis is that an exoge-
nous increase in the supply of funds to the intermediary sector (following, e.g., capital
inows) lowers interest rates and raises the number of imprudent intermediaries (the
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risk-taking channel of low interest rates). Another one is that easy nancing may
lead an increasing number of intermediaries to gamble for resurection following a bad
shock to the sectors capital, again raising economywide systemic risk (the gambling-
for-resurection channel of falling equity).
JEL codes: E44; G01; G20. Keywords: Risk shifting; Portfolio correlation; Systemic
risk; Financial opacity.
1 Introduction
The 2007-2010 nancial crisis has rejuvenated the interest in systemic risk in the nancial
system, its dramatic spill over to the real economy and whether and how it should be
addressed by public policies. We contribute to this debate with an analysis of the risk taking
behaviour of nancial intermediaries that have limited liabilities and may deliberately choose
a level of risk in excess of the social optimum. We show how the level of economywide risk
taking depends on the distribution of equity among intermediaries and the level of interest
rate in the economy.
Our key assumption is that outside providers of funds cannot tell apart prudentand
well diversied banks from imprudent ones overly exposed to one particular asset, be-
cause the balance sheets of individual intermediaries is imperfectly observable, or opaque.
This assumption is consistent with the view of several commentators of the crisis including
Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya and Richardson (2009), and Dubecq et al. (2009)1. In the
decade prior to the crisis, risk transfer instruments, which have reached a very large scale in
the U.S., have increased the opacity of banksleverage and risk-taking incentives (Acharya
and Schnabl, 2009). First, regulatory loopholes allowed banks evade capital requirements
by securitising assets and providing (unregulated) liquidity support to shadow(i.e., o¤-
balance-sheet) entities (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). Second, the nancial sector as a
whole e¤ectively repurchased much of the senior tranches of structured products, whose
payo¤ distributions was particularly di¢ cult to assess (see, e.g., Coval et al., 2009). Third,
some banks actively relied on window dressingto manipulate leverage gures by selling
asset before the books releases to repurchase them at a later date (see, e.g., The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Last but not least, this opacity may have taken the form
1And the references therein.
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of shadow subsidiaries that were used to absorb poorly performing assets, as was revealed
by the investigation on Lehmans bankruptcy.2
While the opacity of the nancial sector may have reached unprecedented level during
the run-up to the crisis and the crisis itself, it has long been recognised as a key issue in that
industry and one of the fundamental reasons for why it should be regulated. For example,
Morgan (2002) shows that bond raters disagree signicantly more about U.S. nancial in-
termediaries than they do over other rms, and interprets this result as evidence that banks
are intrinsically more opaque essentially because their assets are di¢ cult to observe and
change at a fast pace.3 This feature of the industry severely limits the ability of outsiders
(investors and rating agencies alike) to assess changes in banks capital structure in real
time. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 reports the standard errors of an AR(2) regression
of the idiosyncratic component of the capital-asset ratio of 90 French banks over the period
1993Q2-2009Q1. These standard deviations are sorted from the smallest to the largest. It
is striking that for more than a quarter of these banks the one-quarter-ahead standard de-
viation of the forecast error in the capital-asset ratio is higher than 2%. To summarise, the
intrinsic nature of the banking industry combined with the recent trends in nancial inno-
vations have made it especially di¢ cult for outside providers of funds to accurately assess
the true net worth level of individual banks.
When intermediariesbalance sheet is opaque, those with relatively low levels of capital
may be tempted to hold high-risk asset portfolios, or even to gamble for resurrection in the
2On April 13, 2010, the New York Time reported that Lehman Brothers operated a side business that
allowed the defunct brokerage to transfer risky investments o¤ its books in the years leading up to its collapse,
according to a report published Tuesday 13 April 2010. The rm, called Hudson Castle, appeared to be an
independent company, but played an important "behind-the-scenes role" at Lehman, .... Hudson is part of
a "vast nancial system" that operates largely beyond the reach of banking regulators. But banks can use
such entities to raise cash by trading investments and, at times, make their nances look articially strong.
The report said Lehman conducted several transactions greater than $1 billion with Hudson vehicles, but
added that it is unclear how much money was involved since 2001. Critics charge that this type of creative
nancing allowed Lehman and other major banks to temporarily transfer risky investments in subprime
mortgages and commercial real estate, the report said. While most of the deals done through operations
such as Hudson are legal, the report points out that bank examiners have recently raised questions about
other dubious accounting practices at Lehman.
3See also Iannotta (2006) for similar evidence about European banks, and Flannery et al. (2010) on the
increase in the opacity of U.S. banks during the crisis.
3
Figure 1: Ranked forecast errors of an AR(2) of the idiosyncratic component of the capi-
tal/asset ratio for 90 French banks. These are obtained in two stages. First, the capital-asset
ratio of each of the 90 banks is regressed on their rst three time-series common static factors
(principal components). Second, the residual of this regression (which approximate the idio-
syncratic movements of this ratio), is modelled as an AR(2) process, from which the standard
deviation of the forecast error is computed. Data source: Banque de France, Commission
Bancaire (see Jimborean and Mésonnier, 2010, for further desciption of the data).
face of worsening economic conditions. In our model, intermediarieslimited liability creates
an incentives to correlate asset portfolios and raise leverage, thereby allowing intermediaries
to raise their return on equity in case of success while transferring much of their losses to
their creditors in case of failure. This tendency, however, is alleviated by intermediaries
shareholdersinitial equity stake, which disciplines risk-taking, thereby limiting leverage and
favouring diversication. We show that this trade-o¤ gives rise to an endogenous sorting
of intermediaries along the equity dimension, with well capitalised intermediaries holding
diversied portfolios and keeping a limited level of leverage (that is, behaving prudently),
and poorly capitalised ones heavily resorting to leverage to invest in correlated assets (i.e.,
4
behaving imprudently). Opacity implies that the former are not readily distinguishable from
the latter, so that risk-prone behaviour may prosper without being immediately sanctioned
by higher borrowing rates.
One property of our model is that the proportion of imprudent intermediaries and, there-
fore, the level of systemic risk in the nancial system, crucially depend on both the cross-
sectional distribution of capital and the prevailing interest rate. The endogenous determina-
tion of the number of imprudent intermediaries jointly with the (equilibrium) interest rate is
our key contribution. Equipped with this joint equilibrium outcome, we analyse the impact
on the interest rate and the number of imprudent intermediaries of two exogenous shocks: a
lending boom that shifts the loan supply curve rightwards; and an equity squeeze that shifts
the distribution of banks capital leftwards. As we show, the downward pressure on the
equilibrium interest rate that follows the lending boom raises the number of imprudent in-
termediaries and hence the level of economywide risk shifting (the risk-taking channel of low
interest rates). An equity squeeze, that is, a reduction in the equity value of intermediaries
shareholders after a negative aggregate shock, has the same e¤ect provided that the supply
of funds is su¢ ciently elastic (the gambling-for-resurrection channel of falling equity). The
evidence strongly suggests that both shocks occurred in the run-up to the current crisis. In
the rst half of the 2000 decade, both capital inows from China and oil-exporting countries
into the U.S. and the accommodative monetary policy of the Fed contributed to keep the
yield curve very low; according to our model, this would have favoured imprudent behaviour
by an increasing number of banks those at the lower end of the capital distributionthereby
raising their risk exposure and the amount of systemic risk in the economy.4 Second, the
tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 2004 and the rise in delinquency rates on subprime
mortgages from 2006 onwards may have deteriorated the equity position of exposed interme-
diaries, and hence favored gambling-for-resurection strategies. Landier et al. (2010) provide
direct evidence of this behaviour for New Century Financial Corporation, a major subprime
originator prior to its bankruptcy in 2007.5
4See Jimenez et al. (2010) for direct evidence that falling short-term interest rates favour risk-taking by
banks that are at the lower end of the capital distribution.
5According to Landier et al. (2010), rising interest rate were conducive to more risk shifting, while many
authors (e.g. Diamond and Rajan, 2009) suggests that low interest rates favor leverage and excess risk-taking.
However, two e¤ects of interest rates on intermediariesrisk taking must be distinguished. First, holding the
equity stake of bankowners xed, low interest rates may indeed favor high leverage and risk taking. However,
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Related literature. In our model, systemic risk in the nancial sector arises from the
interaction between i. intermediarieslimited liability and option to default (the risk shifting
problem); ii. their incentive to correlate their risk exposure (the endogenous correlation
problem); and iii. the di¢ culty for outside lenders to discriminate individual institutions on
the basis of their true net worth level (the opacity problem). While our model is the rst to
explicitly connect these three dimensions, we build on many contributions that have studied
each of them separately.
Our modelling of the risk shifting problem closely follows Allen and Gale (2000) and
Acharya (2009), who show that limited liability leads nancial institutions to overweight
risky assets in their portfolio, relative to the rst best.6 There are two main di¤erences
between earlier models of risk shifting and ours. In Allen and Gale, market segmentation
and limited-liability debt contracts twist intermediariesrisk-taking incentives and leads to
an overvaluation (or bubble) in the price of the risky asset (a feature that is also in Challe
and Ragot and Dubecq et al.). In Acharya, risky assets are in exible supply so that their
quantity (rather than price) adjust to clear the market. All these models share the property
that intermediariesexcessive risk-taking is ubiquitous: risky assets always have excessive
space in intermediaries portfolios, leading all of them to be exposed to bankruptcy risk.
We see this property as somewhat extreme, which leads us to emphasise the disciplining
role of initial shareholders equity stake and to endogenise each intermediarys (discrete)
choice of adopting or not a bankruptcy-prone behaviour based on the expected costs and
benets of doing so. The second di¤erence with earlier contributions concerns the way we
model excessive risk taking: while earlier models rely on intermediariesoverexposure to a
risky asset relative to a safe one, in ours excessive risk taking exclusively takes the form of
insu¢ cient portfolio diversication in equilibrium.
This asset correlation problem has been the focus on several recent contributions, both
empirical and theoretical. Acharya and Richardson (2009) notably document the overex-
posure of the U.S. banking sector to securitised mortgages prior to the current crisis, with
the risk associated with those securities being e¤ectively kept within the sector (via the
use of unregulated liquidity enhancements or the repurchase of CDO tranches) rather than
rising interest rates lower asset values, which in turn deplete bankownersnet equity positions ex post and
may trigger the gambling-for-resurection logic. Our model is consistent both views.
6see also Rochet (1992) for an early analysis of bank risk taking under limited liability.
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transferred to other investors and disseminated throughout the economy. Greenlaw et al.
(2008) had reached similar conclusions. The dominant explanation for this excessive corre-
lation, apparently at odds with standard nance theory, is that it is natural consequence
of the time-inconsistency of ex post bail-out or interest rate policies; namely, it is optimal
to save banks ex post when a large number of them fails, which precisely occurs when they
have chosen correlated portfolios in the rst place see Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and
Fahri and Tirole (2010). Our model di¤ers from those in the source of moral hazard that
leads to excess portfolio correlation, i.e., limited liability rather than time-inconsistent poli-
cies. In Acharya (2009), the economywide correlation of risks arises from systemic failure
externalities amongst intermediaries. The main di¤erence between Acharyas endogenous
correlation mechanism and ours is that in his framework banks are assumed to hold undiver-
sied portfolio (because they are industry-specic lenders), and the puzzle to be explained is
why correlation occurs across banks (i.e., why they tend to lend to the same industries). By
contrast, in our model banks are unspecialised and choose the correlation of their portfolio
at the individual level; but since those who opt for highly correlated portfolios favour the
stochastically dominated asset, the very same asset is overinvested in at the aggregate level,
hence more risk-taking at the individual level directly translates into greater systemic risk.
Finally, a number of authors have discussed the adverse consequences of the opacity of the
nancial sector for nancial stability. The di¢ culty for (unsophisticated) outside lenders of
perfectly observing bank assets is a traditional argument for why banks need to be supervised
(e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). More recently, Biais et al. (2010) have argued that
nancial innovations create asymmetric information problems that worsen the opacity of the
nancial sector. Our model focuses on one specic implication of opacity: the fact that
outside providers of funds may nd it di¢ cult to accurately measure bank shareholderstrue
stake and hence to adequately assess their risk-taking incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
characterises the optimal behaviour of intermediaries. Section 3 derives the equilibrium level
of interest rate and systemic risk in the opaque economy, and carries out some comparative
statics experiments. Section 4 uses a parameterised version of the model to analyse how
noisy public signals about intermediariesbalance-sheet quality may e¤ect the equilibrium.
Section 5 explores the consequences of imposing naive capital ratios in this framework.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 Timing, states and assets
There are two dates, t = f1; 2g ; two possible states at date 2, s = fs1; s2g ; and two (supply-
elastic) real assets available for purchase at date 1, a = fa1; a2g. At date 1, loan contracts
are signed and investments in the real assets take place; at date 2, the state is revealed, asset
payo¤s are collected and nancial contracts are resolved possibly via one partys default.
Any unit of investment in a1 pays R1 = Rh1 > 0 if s = s1 and 0 otherwise, while any unit of
investment in a2 pays R2 = Rh2 > 0 if s = s2 and R
l
2 > 0 otherwise.
7 State s1 (s2) occurs
with probability p (s1)  p = 0:5   ,  > 0 (p (s2) = 1   p.) Finally the two assets are
assumed to have identical expected payo¤s, i.e.,
pRh1 = pR
l
2 + (1  p)Rh2 : (1)
Our assumed joint payo¤ distribution has the following properties: when considered in
isolation, a1 is more risky (in the sense of mean-preserving spread) than a2; however, the
strict negative correlation between the two assets implies that one of them may be used as a
hedge against the portfolio risk generated by the other. In particular, a suitably diversied
portfolio pays the certain gross return pRh1 thereby entirely eliminating bankruptcy risk for
a leveraged investor. This simple payo¤ structure allows us to focus on the joint choice of
leverage and portfolio correlation as the ultimate source of endogenous aggregate risk in the
economy.
2.2 Agents and market structure
There are two types of agents in the economy: lendersand intermediaries, both risk-
neutral and in mass one. Our market structure (and implied decisions) is similar to that
in Allen and Gale (2000) and Acharya (2009). In particular, markets are segmented, in the
sense that intermediaries have exclusive access to the menu of assets a (due, for example, to
7Assuming that asset a1 has no liquidation value in state s2 greatly simplify the analysis of Section
4, where we need to sum up the repayments of heterogenous intermediaries to the lenders across states.
Alternatively, one may assume that the asset has some liquidation value but that the latter cannot be
recovered in case of default (due, e.g., to bankrupcy costs).
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asymmetric information, di¤erence in asset management abilities, regulation etc.). Interme-
diaries may borrow from the lenders to achieve their desired level of asset investment, and
are protected by limited liability debt contracts. Once lending has taken place, the portfolio
chosen by the intermediaries is out of the control of the lenders.
We modify this basic framework in two directions. First, we assume that an intermedi-
arys funding partly comes out of inside equity, which will serve both to bu¤er the interme-
diarys balance-sheets against adverse shocks and to discipline its shareholdersrisk-taking
attitude.8 Second, we study the equilibrium of an economy populated by a large number
of intermediaries with heterogenous equity levels that are imperfectly observed by outside
providers of funds.
Intermediaries. Intermediaries shareholders maximise value, given their (exogenously
given) initial equity stake e > 0. Denoting by (xi)i=1;2  0 the portfolio of an intermediary,
its balance sheet constraint may be written as:
P
xi  e+ b; (2)
with i = 1; 2 and where b is the intermediarys debt. Intermediaries face a convex, nonpecu-
niary investment cost c (
P
xi), which satises c0 (:) > 0, c00 (:) < 0 and c (0) = 0. For the sake
of tractability, our analysis in the body of the paper is carried out under the assumption
that c (:) is quadratic, but we show in Appendix B that all our results carry over to the more
general isoelastic case. More specically, c (:) takes the form:
c (
P
xi) = (2)
 1 (
P
xi)
2 ;  > 0: (3)
Given its initial equity stake e and a contracted gross interest rate r on borrowed funds,
an intermediary chooses (xi) and, by implication, b i.e., it chooses both the size and the
structure of the balance sheet. Limited liability implies that an intermediarys payo¤ net
of debt repayment is bounded below by zero, so the ex post net payo¤ generated by the
portfolio (xi) is:
max [
P
xiRi   rb; 0]
8This paper focuses on agency problems between the intermediarys owner-manager and its creditors,
and hence abstracts from incorporating inobservability and conict of interest between the owners and the
managers. See Acharya et al. (2010) for a model of risk-shifting that explicitely incorporates both dimensions.
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Substituting (2) (with equality) into the latter expression, we nd the date 1 value
(including the nonpecuniary cost) of an intermediary with initial equity e to be:
V (e) = max
xi0
P
sp (s) (max [re+
P
xi (Ri   r) ; 0])  c (
P
xi) ; (4)
with s = 1; 2.
In solving (4), intermediaries di¤er in the amount of the inside equity stake of its share-
holders, e. The cross-sectional equity distribution is assumed to be characterised by a con-
tinuous density function f (e; ) with support [0; emax] and c.d.f. F (e; ) =
R e
0
f (i; ) di.
Since the number of intermediaries is normalised to one we have F (emax; ) = 1, while
E  R emax
0
ef (e; ) di is the total capital of the intermediary sector. The parameter  indexes
the location of the density function, with an increase in  being associated with a rightward
shifts in the distribution of equity level (so that F (e; ) < 0.)
Lenders. Funds are supplied by households (the lenders), who lend their funds to the
intermediary sector at date 1 in order to collect repayments at date 2. Each lender enjoys
labour income w > 0 at date 1 and maximises u (c1) + c2s, where c1 is date 1 consumption,
c2s consumption at date 2 in state s, and u (:) a twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave function. Let s denote lendersex post date 2 return in
state s from lending to the intermediary sector, and   Psp (s) s the corresponding
ex ante return (Note that both in general di¤er from the face lending rate r due to the
possibility of intermediariesdefault.) Lenders choose their loan supply Bs, where Bs =
arg maxu (c1) +
P
sp (s) c2s, subject to c1 = w  B and c2s = Bs. The implied loan supply
curve is:
Bs (;w) = w   u0 1 () ; (5)
which is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments. In short, risk neutrality
implies that lenders value the expected return on loans, , with the implied loan return
curve being shifted by date 1 income, w. We impose specic parameter restrictions later on
ensuring that Bs (;w) > 0 in equilibrium.
2.3 First best
The key contractual friction in this economy is that an intermediary maximises the expected
terminal payo¤ to its (risk-neutral) shareholders who are protected by limited liability 
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and hence transfer losses to the debtors in case of default. Before further analysing the
implications of this distortion, we compute the rst-best outcome, where this distortion is
removed.
Planners problem. Since a1 and a2 have identical expected payo¤ and are perfectly
negatively correlated, a fully diversied portfolio that entirely eliminates the payo¤ risk is
always e¢ cient, at least weakly. A portfolio (xi)i=1;2 pays the certain payo¤ (
P
xi) pR
h
1 if it
pays identical payo¤s across states, that is, if it satises
x1R
h
1 + x2R
l
2 = x2R
h
2 ; (6)
where the left and right hand sides are the portfolio payo¤s in states s1 and s2, respectively.
Equation (6) implies that the riskless portfolio must be composed of the following asset
shares:
x^1P
x^i
= p

Rh2  Rl2
Rh2

;
x^2P
x^i
= p

Rh1
Rh2

: (7)
Equation (7) characterises the structure of the portfolio but not its optimal size. Let
~C denote the total consumption of intermediaries (shareholders), and C1 and C2 the total
consumption of lenders at date 1 and 2, respectively. The planner solves maxu (C1)+C2+ ~C,
subject to the following rst- and second-period resource constraints:
(
P
x^i) + C1 = w + E; C2 + ~C = (
P
x^i) pR
h
1   c (
P
x^i) :
Hence, the optimal level of investment
P
x^i satises:P
x^i = 

pRh1   u0 (w + E  
P
x^i)

: (8)
Decentralisation. Since the limited-liability constraint is the only friction a¤ecting in-
termediaries portfolio choice, the planners problem can be decentralised by removing this
constraint or equivalently, by punishing default su¢ ciently severely. When the option to
default is not operative, the value of an intermediary in (4) becomes:
V^ (e) = max
xi0
re+ (
P
xi)
 
pRh1   r
  c (Pxi) ; (9)
where we have used the fact that
P
sp (s)
P
xi (Ri   r) = (
P
xi)
 
pRh1   r

under full diver-
sication (and given the payo¤ distribution (1)). From (9), the e¢ cient portfolio satises
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P
x^i = 
 
pRh1   r

. Combined with (1) and (6), we nd it to be:
(x^1; x^2) =


 
pRh1   r

p
Rh2  Rl2
Rh2
; 
 
pRh1   r

p
Rh1
Rh2

: (10)
Portfolio (10) is only weakly dominant because, due to agentsrisk neutrality, a continuum
of portfolios in fact achieve the same welfare outcome as (10). Indeed, for lenders to enjoy the
face return r in both states, it is enough that intermediaries be solvent in both states, which
is possible (to some extent) with an imperfectly diversied portfolio thanks to the bu¤ering
role of intermediariescapital. The solvency conditions impose that a given portfolio (xi)i=1;2
never generates a negative net payo¤ ex post, i.e.,
re+
P
xi (Ri   r)  0; s = s1; s2; (11)
where (R1; R2) =
 
Rh1 ; R
l
2

if s = s1 and
 
0; Rh2

if s = s2. Combining (11) with the optimal
balance-sheet size
P
x^i = 
 
pRh1   r

, we nd that a solvent portfolio must be such that
x1 2 [x1; x1] ; 0 < x1 < x1 <1, where x1 and x1 are:
x1 =

 
pRh1   r
  
r  Rl2
  re
Rh1  Rl2
; x1 =

 
pRh1   r
  
Rh2   r

+ re
Rh2
;
and where x1 < 
 
pRh1   r

whenever the intermediary is leveraged. In short, given the
optimal balance-sheet size 
 
pRh   r ; x1 cannot be too low, otherwise the intermediary
would default in state s1; it cannot be too high either (and hence x2 too low), otherwise
default would occur in state s2. Intermediaries that deviate from the riskless portfolio (x^i)
while still satisfying
P
x^i = 
 
pRh1   r

and x1 2 [x1; x1] will bear some asset risk but are
indi¤erent to it thanks to risk neutrality. These portfolios, which we refer to as prudent, lie
along a closed subinterval of the x2 = 
 
pRh1   r
 x1 line and include the riskless portfolio
(x^i) see Figure 1(a) below.
Equilibrium. To complete the characterisation of the rst-best outcome, we must compute
the equilibrium interest rate r^ that results from the equality of the aggregate demand and
supply for loanable funds. Since
P
x^i = 
 
pRh1   r

, it follows that the leverage of an inter-
mediary with inside equity e and facing the interest rate r is given by b^ (r; e) = 
 
pRh1   r
 e.
The aggregate demand for funds is obtained by summing up the demands for debt by all
intermediaries, i.e.,
B^d (r; ) =
Z emax
0
b^ (r; e) dF (e; ) = 
 
pRh1   r
  E: (12)
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On the other hand, since intermediaries never default in the rst-best equilibrium, lenders
are repaid r with certainty. Hence, we may rewrite (5) as:
B^s (r;w) = w   u0 1 (r) : (13)
B^d (r; ) is continuous and linearly decreasing in r, while B^s (r;w) is continuous and
strictly increasing in r (since u00 (:) < 0). Hence the two curves cross at most once and, if
they do, give a unique equilibrium interest rate r^. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on
equilibria in which all intermediaries are active and leveraged. Lemma 1 provides a su¢ cient
condition for the existence of a rst-best equilibrium with this property.
Lemma 1. Assume that i. pRh1 > emax and ii. w > emax E+u0 1
 
pRh1   emax=

: Then,
the rst-best equilibrium is unique and such that b^ (r; e) > 0 for all e 2 [0; emax].
All proofs are in the Appendix. Essentially, a unique equilibrium with all intermediaries
being leveraged exists if both expected asset payo¤s (i.e., pRh1) and lendersincome (i.e., w)
are su¢ ciently large. This equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2(b) below.
3 Loanable funds equilibrium under risk-shifting
3.1 Intermediariesbehaviour
The presence of the limited-liability debt contracts a¤ect investment choices by altering
intermediariesshareholders payo¤s relative to the rst best. Namely, value maximisation
under limited liability may lead an intermediary to choose a high risk/high expected payo¤
strategy, thereby maximising its own payo¤ in case of success while transferring losses to the
lenders in case default.
We work the problem of an intermediary (i.e., equation (4)) backwards. Let us refer to as
prudentan intermediary whose asset portfolio satises both solvency constraints in (11),
and denote its value as V  (e). Similarly, let us call imprudent an intermediary whose
portfolio violates one of the two inequalities in (11) thereby triggering default in one of
the two states, and denote its value by V  (e). The intermediary chooses the best option,
giving a value to the initial equity holders of V (e) = max [V  (e) ; V  (e)].
13
Prudent intermediaries. Trivially, the absence of the option to default implies that the
portfolio choice of a prudent intermediary is the same as in the rst best:P
xi = 
 
pRh1   r

; x1 < x

1 < x

1; (14)
b (r; e) = 
 
pRh1   r
  e: (15)
Substituting (14)(15) into (9), we nd the value of a prudent intermediary to be:
V  (e) = re+ (=2)
 
pRh1   r
2
(= V^ (e)): (16)
Imprudent intermediaries. Imprudent intermediaries, unlike prudent ones, correlate
their portfolio and consequently default in one of the two states. Consider rst the optimal
portfolio choice of an intermediary having chosen to overweight asset a1 in its portfolio,
and thus defaults at date 2 if state s2 occurs. Ex ante, this intermediary earns zero with
probability 1  p, so the objective (4) becomes:
max
xi0
V (e) = p
 
re+ x1
 
Rh1   r

+ x2
 
Rl2   r
  c (Pxi) (17)
Since x1 and x2 enter symmetrically in the cost function while Rh1 > R
l
2, the intermediary
must entirely disregard a2, leading to the optimal portfolio:
(x1 ; x

2 ) =
 
p
 
Rh1   r

; 0

; (18)
b (r; e) = p
 
Rh1   r
  e: (19)
An alternative investment strategy for an imprudent intermediary would be to overweight
a2; and hence to default if s1 occurs ex post. However, it is straightforward to show that it is
never optimal to do so under our distributional assumptions. Indeed, imprudent behaviour
implies that the intermediary earns zero if the wrong state occurs, and accordingly only val-
ues the state corresponding to the asset being invested in. Since the univariate distribution
of a1 is a mean-preserving spread of that of a2, a1 has more value to the imprudent inter-
mediary than a2.9 Substituting (18) into (17), we nd the optimised value of an imprudent
intermediary to be:
V  (e) = pre+ (=2)
 
p
 
Rh1   r
2
: (20)
9An intermediary choosing the default in state s1 does not value payo¤s in that state and hence max-
imises (1  p)  x1 (0  r) + x2  Rh2   r+ re   c (x1 + x2), leading to the optimal portfolio (~x1 ; ~x2 ) = 
0;  (1  p)  Rh2   r : Computing and comparing the ex ante utility levels associated with (x1 ; x2 ) and
(~x1 ; ~x

2 ) leads the former to be prefered, provided that  is not too large.
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To summarise, imprudent intermediaries have two distinguishing characteristics, relative
to prudent intermediaries. First, they perfectly correlated their asset portfolio (since x2 =
0), thereby maximising both their payo¤ in case of success and lenders losses in case of
default. Second, they endogenously choose a larger balance sheet size (since x1 >
P
xi ),
which in turns implies more leverage for any given level of equity e (i.e., b (r; e) > b (r; e)).
This latter property is a direct implication of the fact that imprudent intermediaries avoid
repayment with probability 1   p: This e¤ectively lowers the cost of debt ex ante for any
given face interest rate r, relative to the cost faced by prudent intermediaries (who repay in
both states). In the (x1; x2) plane, the imprudent portfolio lies on the x1 axis and the left
of the x2 = 
 
pRh1   r
  x1 line see Figure 1(a).
x1
x1*
Prudent portfolios
Riskless portfolio
x2
x1**
Imprudent portfolio
*1x
V(e)
V*(e)
V**(e)
e
max[V*(e), V**(e)]
)(~ re
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Intermediariesoptimal portfolios (a) and value (b).
Value of an intermediary. Expressions (16) and (20) reect the joint roles of equity
and the borrowing rate in a¤ecting the intermediarys value and thus incentives to behave
prudently or imprudently. For a given level of equity and borrowing rate, imprudent in-
termediaries buy larger portfolios, consequently earn large payo¤s in case of success, which
goes towards raising value (see the second term in the right hand side of both expressions);
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however, they also risk losing their equity (with probability 1   p), which tends to reduce
value for any given initial equity stake (the rst term). Comparing (16) and (20) and assum-
ing that indi¤erent intermediaries behave prudently, we nd that an intermediary engages
in imprudent behaviour whenever its equity state is su¢ ciently low, that is, if and only if:
e < ~e (r)  

pRh1  

1 + p
2

r

(21)
Equation (21) implies that a poorly capitalised intermediary, i.e., one with low equity
stake and hence relatively little to lose in case of default, will engage in imprudent behaviour,
while an intermediary with high shareholdersequity stake, and hence much to lose in case
of default, will behave prudently. The implied value of an intermediary as a function of e,
i.e., V (e) = max [V  (e) ; V  (e)] is depicted in Figure 1(b).
A key implication of (21) is that lower borrowing rates raise the cut-o¤ equity level below
which the intermediary chooses to behave imprudently. To further understand why this is
the case, compare the impact of a marginal rise in r on V  (e) and V  (e) that is, for each
strategy, the loss in the intermediarys value associated with a rise in the face nancing cost.
Using (16) and (20), we nd these falls to be:
V r (e) =  b (r; e) ; V r (e) =  pb (r; e) :
These expressions follow from the envelop theorem and have a straightforward interpre-
tation. For the prudent intermediary, who never defaults and hence always repays r per
unit of debt, the loss in value associated with a marginal rise in r is its total amount debt,
b (r; e) : For the imprudent intermediary, who only repays in state 1, the loss in value is the
relevant amount of debt, b (r; e), times the probability that it will actually be repaid, p.
For a rise in r to lower the threshold ~e, it must be the case that V  (e) increases more than
V  (e) for the marginal intermediary, i.e., that for whom V  (~e) = V  (~e) (i.e., that inter-
mediary must turn prudent, rather than imprudent, following a rise in the interest rate). It
must be the case that V r (~e) > V

r (~e) or, equivalently by using the two expressions above,
b (r; ~e) < pb (r; ~e): a switch by the marginal intermediary from the prudent to the impru-
dent investment strategy must involve a su¢ ciently large increase in leverage. This property
can be shown to hold not only in the quadratic case but also for any isoelastic investment
cost function (see Appendix B for details).
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3.2 Aggregate demand for funds
Our key assumption here is that while the distribution of equity levels is perfectly known
by outside lenders, nancial opacity prevents lenders from observing the equity levels any
particular intermediary. Hence, lenders cannot condition the loan rate on the specic equity
level of an intermediary, so that a single borrowing rate r applies to the entire market.10
Then, we may dene
g (r; ) 
Z ~e(r)
0
f (e; ) de = F (~e (r) ; ) (22)
as the proportion of imprudent intermediaries in the economy at a given interest rate r.
Note that gr (r; ) =   (1 + p) f (~e (r) ; ) =2 < 0; that is, a lower face interest rate raises the
proportion of imprudent intermediaries in the economy by increasing the threshold equity
level ~e (r). Moreover, we have g (r; ) = F (~e; ) < 0, that is, an increase in  lowers the
proportion of imprudent intermediary (for any given value of the cut-o¤ ~e (r)).
The total demand for funds aggregates the leverage choices of individual intermediaries,
appropriately weighted by their shares in the economy. It is thus given by:
Bd (r; ) =
Z ~e(r)
0
b (r; e) dF (e; ) +
Z emax
~e(r)
b (r; e) dF (e; ) : (23)
Equation (23) shows that the interest rate will a¤ect the demand for loanable funds in two
ways: rst, it will a¤ect the demand for funding of every single intermediaries (the intensive
leverage margin); and second, by shifting the threshold ~e (r), it will cause a discontinuous
change in the leverage choice of some of them, from prudent to imprudent or the other
way around (the extensive leverage margin.) Substituting (15) and (19) into the latter
expression, using (22) and rearranging, the total demand for funds is found to be:
Bd (r; ) = 

pRh1   r (1  (1  p) g (r; ))
  E: (24)
In the (B; r) plane, the Bd (r; ) curve lies to the right of the B^d (r; ) curve, its rst-best
counterpart. This is because, for any given value of r, the risk-shifting equilibrium includes
a nonnegative fraction of imprudent intermediaries, whose demand for debt is larger than
that of prudent intermediaries at any given interest rate r (see Figure 2(b)).
10We assume for simplicity that intermediaries are completely identical from the point of view of the
lender. Our result carry over in a set-up with partially segmented market involving di¤erent groups of
intermediaries, with the members of each group facing the same interest rate. What matters for our results
is the presence of an unbserved residual heterogeneity in interminedariesequity stake.
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There are two properties of the aggregate demand for loanable funds that are worth
discussing at this stage. First, it is continuous and decreasing in the borrowing rate, i.e.,
Bdr (r; ) =   (1  (1  p) g (r; )) +  (1  p) rgr (r; ) < 0:
Two factors contribute to make the demand for funds a downward-sloping function of r.
First, a lower interest rate raises the leverage of both prudent and imprudent intermediaries
see the optimal investment rules (14) and (18). Second, a lower interest rate induces
marginal intermediaries (those which are close to the cut-o¤ equity level ~e in (21)) to
switch from prudent to imprudent behaviour, and those experience a discontinuous increase
in their leverage again, by (14) and (18). Hence, changes in the borrowing rate a¤ect the
intensive(i.e., conditional on not switching behaviour) and extensive(i.e., the number
of intermediaries who switch behaviour) leverage margins in the same direction.
The second relevant property of the curve is that, holding r constant, Bd increases as the
distribution of equity shifts leftwards. That is,
Bd (r; ) = r (1  p) g (r; ) < 0:
This is because, as the equity level of intermediaries decreases, some of them switch from
prudent to imprudent behaviour. As imprudent intermediaries choose higher leverage than
prudent ones, this composition e¤ect translate into an upward shift in the aggregate demand
for funds.
3.3 Aggregate supply of funds
The aggregate supply of funds depends on the expected return on loans, , which under
risk shifting not only depends on the face borrowing rate but also on both the share of
imprudent intermediaries and the probability that they go bankrupt. In state 1, which
occurs with probability p, all intermediaries repay the face interest rate r to the lenders:
prudent intermediaries because they are always able to, imprudent ones because their risky
bets turned out to be successful. In state 2, which occurs with complementary probability,
only prudent intermediaries, which are in number 1 g (r; ), are able to repay r. Imprudent
intermediariesbets, on the contrary, turn out to be unsuccessful, leaving lenders with no
repayment at all. Summing up unit repayments across states and intermediaries types and
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rearranging, we nd the ex ante gross return on loans to be:
 (r; ) = pr + (1  p) (1  g (r; )) r (25)
= r (1  (1  p) g (r; )) :
Note that this ex ante return is strictly increasing in the face interest rate, i.e.,
r (r; ) = 1  (1  p) g (r; )  (1  p) rgr (r; ) > 0: (26)
The increasingness of  (r; ) with respect to r occurs for two reasons. First, a higher face
interest rate increases intermediariesrepayment if they do not default (the 1 (1  p) g (r; ) >
0 part of (26)). Second, a higher face interest rate favours prudent rather than risky behav-
iour by raising the threshold ~e, and hence by lowering the probability of default on a loan
unit (the   (1  p) gr (r; ) > 0 part). It follows that for (; w) given the loan supply function
is a nondecreasing, continuous function of r, which we may express as:
Bs (r; ; w) = w   u0 1 (r (1  (1  p) g (r; ))) : (27)
Let us briey summarise the properties of the aggregate supply curve, before we analyse
the equilibrium in the market for loanable funds. First, Bs (r; ; w) is strictly increasing in
r; holding (; w) constant; this follows from (5), the strictly concavity of u(:), and the strict
monotonicity of  w.r.t. r (see (26)). Second, from (5) it is strictly increasing in w, holding
r and  constant. Third, it is increasing in , holding r and w constant. The reason for
this is that a higher overall level of equity in the economy raises the number of prudent
intermediaries (i.e., g (r; ) < 0), and hence the expected return on loans (see (25)).
In the (B; r) plane, theBs (r; ; w) curve lies to the left of its rst-best analogue, B^s (r; ; w) :
This is because in the equilibrium with risk shifting lenders expect a nonnegative fraction of
intermediaries to go bankrupt if state s2 occurs. Hence, any given value of the face interest
rate r is associated with a lower expected return in the risk-shifting equilibrium than in the
rst-best and hence with a lower supply of loanable funds (see Figure 2(b)).
3.4 Market clearing
In equilibrium, the total demand for funds by the intermediary sector must equal the total
supply of funds provided by outside lenders. In other words, the face interest rate that clears
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the market for loanable funds must satisfy
Bs (r; ; w) = Bd (r; ) (28)
Since Bd (r; ) is continuously decreasing in r while Bs (r; ; w) is continuously increasing
in r, the equilibrium is unique provided that it exists. Again, we are focusing on risk-shifting
equilibria in which all intermediaries are leveraged, the conditions under which this is the
case being summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that i. pRh1 > emax and ii.
w > max

u0 1
 
pRh   E= ; r (1  p) g ((r; ))  E + u0 1 (r (1  (1  p) g (r; ))) ;
where r = pRh1   emax=: Then, the equilibrium with risk shifting is unique and such that
b (e) and b (e) are positive fall all e 2 [0; emax].
To summarise, the equilibrium is well behaved provided that lendersincome, w; is suf-
ciently large. The existence conditions stated in Lemma 2 are slightly more stringent than
those stated in Lemma 1, so the former also ensure the existence of the rst-best outcome
characterised in Section 2.3.
The equilibrium in the market for loanable funds is depicted in Figure 2(b). The inter-
section of the two curves gives the equilibrium contracted loan rate r, given the exogenous
parameter set (; w). The loan rate in turn determines the equilibrium share of imprudent
intermediaries g (r; ) (by equation (22)), as well as the equilibrium expected return on loans
to intermediaries,  (r; ) (by (25)). Note that despite di¤erences in the implied equilibrium
interest rate in the two economies, the equilibrium amount of aggregate lending is the same.
Indeed, the interest rate in the rst-best equilibrium satises 
 
pRh1   r^
 E = w u0 1 (r^) ;
while the expected rate of return in the risk-shifting equilibrium satises 

pRh1   
 E =
w  u0 1 (). This implies that  = r^ (i.e., lendersexpected compensation for their loans in
the same across the two equilibria), so that Bs (;w) = B^s (r^;w) (i.e., they lend the same
amount). From (25) and the fact that  = r^, we nd the interest rate premium generated
by the presence of imprudent intermediaries to be:
r
r^
=
g (r; )
(1  p) 1   g (r; ) ;
which is positive and increasing in the both the number of such intermediaries, g (r; ), and
the probability that they go bust, 1  p.
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Figure 2. Share of imprudent intermediaries (a) and loanable funds equilibrium (b).
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4 Impact of aggregate shocks
We may now state the main predictions of the model about how shifts in the underlying
fundamentals (the supply of funds and the distribution of intermediariescapital) a¤ect the
three key equilibrium variables, r,  (r; ) and g (r; ) : These predictions are summarised in
the following propositions.
Proposition 1 (Lending boom). An exogenous increase in the supply of funds (i.e.,
dw > 0) i) lowers the equilibrium contracted rate, r, ii) lowers the expected return on loans,
 (r; ), and iii) raises the share of imprudent intermediaries in the economy, g (r; ).
Proposition 1 essentially states that easier nancing conditions for intermediaries tend
to fuel systemic risk by inducing an increasing number of intermediaries to take larger and
riskier bets; conversely, tighter credit raises the interest rate and discipline banksrisk-taking
behaviour. The e¤ect of the boom shift in the funds supply curve is depicted in Figure 3(a).
More specically, the boom is associated with a rightward shift in the Bs locus, whose direct
e¤ect is to lower the equilibrium contracted loan rate. Holding  constant, the new value
of r is associated with a lower value of the equity cuto¤ ~e (r) in (21); so that a increasing
number of intermediaries turn from prudent to imprudent i.e., g (r; ) rises. Both the lower
value of r and the higher value of g (r; ) contribute to lower the expected return on loans,
 (r; ).
While our analysis remains formal, several interpretations may be given to the shift in
credit supply leading to easier nancing conditions. According to Bernanke (2005), for ex-
ample, a supply-driven shift in funding occurred in the rst half of the last decade due to
recycled balance-of-payment surpluses from China and oil-exporting countries; in this inter-
pretation, systemic risk in the U.S. was closely related to the global imbalancesproblem,
which was itself rooted in the willingness of surplus countries to hoard wealth in the form of
U.S. assets. Another view has it that exceptionally loose monetary policy leading to exceed-
ingly low real interest rates in the wake of the 2001 recession in the U.S. would have given
rise to a risk-takingchannel of monetary policy, thereby fostering widespread systemic risk
in the U.S. nancial sector (see Taylor, 2009, Adrian and Shin, 2010, as well as Altunbas et
al. (2010) for a survey and some evidence).11 Be it the consequence of either or both, the
11As argued by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2009), these two views are likely more complementary than substi-
tutes.
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model unambiguously predicts that falling interest rates raise risk-taking by an increasing
number of banks and hence the economywide level of risk. Moreover, the model predicts that
this increase in aggregate risk is rooted in changes in the portfolio choices of less capitalised
intermediaries i.e., those to the left of, but close to, the equity cuto¤ ~e (r). This channel is
consistent with the ndings of Jiminez et al. (2010), who study the risk-taking behaviour of a
panel of Spanish banks and nd that falling short-term rates increase risk-taking low-capital
banks (rather than the averagebank.)
Proposition 2 (Equity squeeze). A downward shift in the distribution of equity (i.e.,
d < 0) raises the equilibrium interest rate, r. If the elasticity of the credit supply with
respect to  is su¢ ciently high, then it also raises the share of imprudent intermediaries,
g (r; ).
Proposition 2 reects the three e¤ects at work following a downward shifts in the dis-
tribution of equity. First, for a given value of the cut-o¤ ~e, the shift directly increases the
number of imprudent banks in the economy by lowering the stake of marginal interme-
diaries (i.e., those who are initially to the right of, but close to, ~e); those intermediaries
then discontinuously raise their leverage while engaging in imprudent behaviour (see (14)
and (18)), thereby raising the demand for funds. Second, to the extent that this shift lowers
the overall equity base of the intermediary sector, E, all intermediaries, which have a target
portfolio size, seek to o¤set the loss in internal funding by external debt, again raising the
economywide demand for funding. Both of these e¤ects shift the Bd-curve rightwards and
exert an upward pressure on the equilibrium borrowing rate, r. Third, this increase in the
borrowing rate has a disciplining e¤ect on the intermediary sector by shifting the cut-o¤
equity level ~e leftwards. Hence, while the e¤ect of the equity squeeze on the borrowing rate
is not ambiguous, that on the share of imprudent intermediaries is. However, if the supply
of funds is su¢ ciently elastic, the adjustment of the borrowing rate after the shock and its
disciplining e¤ect will be limited, causing g (r; ) to rise.
This situation is depicted in Figure 3(b). The initial distributional shift causes the
g (r; ) curve to shift leftwards. The direct impact of higher risk (holding r xed) is to
lower the expected return on loans,  (r; ), which in the (B; r) plane manifests itself as an
exogenous reduction in lending (i.e., an inwards shift of the Bs curve). Finally, the increase
in the demand for funding causes the Bd-curve to shift rightwards. If the supply of funds
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is su¢ ciently elastic (that is, the slope of the Bs curve is su¢ ciently low), then the overall
e¤ect of the three shifts is to raise the equilibrium value of g (r; )
r
g(r,e)
Bs(r;e,w)
Bd(r;e)
(a) Lending boom
r
g(r,e)
(b) Equity squeeze
(elastic supply of funds)
Bd(r;e)
Bs(r;e,w)
B
B
Figure 3. Impact of a lending boom (a) and a equity squeeze (b) on the interest rate, r,
and the share of imprudent intermediaries, g (r; ).
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5 Information about intermediariesbalance-sheets and
endogenous market segmentation
Our analysis above emphasise intermediaries balance-sheet opacity as a major source of
systemic risk. The key mechanism is that the unobservability of balance sheets makes it
possible for bad banks to pretend to be good banks, implying that clearing of the market
for loanable funds operates in a single market and at a single interest rate. In order to make
this channel as transparent as possible, we derived our results under the somewhat extreme
assumption that all intermediaries look alike from the point of view of outside lenders. In
reality, some public (and private) information about intermediariesbalance-sheet is available
that may mitigate the opacity problem. In this Section, we extend our analysis to allow for
(noisy) signals about intermediariess capital, which naturally generates a di¤erentiation of
the market for loanable funds in as much a goodand badintermediaries can to some
extent be recognised as such. For the sake of tractability we illustrate this possibility by
means of a simple parametric example, but we conjecture that the properties that come out
of this exercise hold much more generally.
Distributions, signal structure and parameters. We assume here that the uncon-
ditional distribution of intermediairesinside equity is uniform with support [0; 1], so that
f (e) = 1, F (e) = e and E = 1=2. Outside lenders receive the following symmetric bi-
nary signal  about every intermediary: if e  1=2, then  = g (good) with probability
 2 [1=2; 1) and  = b (bad) w.p. 1   . Symmetrically, if e < 1=2, then  = b with
probability  and  = g w.p. 1   . Under these assumptions, the marginal density of the
signals is simply Pr ( = h) = Pr ( = l) = 1=2. From Bayesrule, the observation of the
signal produces the following two conditional distributions and cumulative density functions
(both of which are indexed by the signal quality ):
f (ej g; ) =
8<: 2 (1  ) for e < 122 for e  1
2
; F (ej g; ) =
8<: 2 (1  ) e for e < 121  2 + 2e for e  1
2
(29)
f (ej b; ) =
8<: 2 for e < 122 (1  ) for e  1
2
; F (ej b; ) =
8<: 2e for e < 122   1 + 2 (1  ) e for e  1
2
(30)
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Note that the quality of the signal encompasses two limit cases. When  = 1=2, the signal
is uninformative and the two conditional distributions coincide with the unconditional one.
When  ! 1, in the limit the signals exactly identify every intermediary as belonging to the
upper or the lower halves of the distribution. Regarding the other deep parameters, we set
p = w = 1=2;  = 1, Rh1 = 4: Finally, we focus on the case where u (:) = 0, so that lenders
only value terminal consumption and inelastically lend w to the intermediary sector.
The signals identify two categories of intermediaries, and hence two separate markets for
loanable funds, each with their own face interest rate. In each market, the problem of an
individual intermediary in is similar to that described in Section 3, except that they now take
their own face borrowing rate r as given. Under the assumed parameters, an intermediary
borrowing in market ;  = b; g; behaves prudently if and only if
e  ~e (r ) = 2  3r

4
; (31)
while the share of imprudent intermediaries in that market is given by:
g (r ; ) = F ( ~e (r )j  ; ) ;
where F ( ~e (r )j  ; ) is determined by (29)(31).
We may now compute the demand for funds in each market by integrating intermediaries
leverage choices as in (24). Under our parameters, the demand for funds in market  is
Bd; (r ; ) =
Z ~e(r )
0
b (r ; e) dF (ej  ; ) +
Z 1
~e(r )
b (r ; e) dF (ej s; )
= 2  r

1  1
2
g (r ; )

  E ; (32)
where, from equations (29)(30),
Eb =
Z 1
0
ef (ej b; ) de = 3  2
4
; Eg =
Z 1
0
ef (ej g; ) de = 1 + 2
4
:
Uninformative signals. Let us rst solve for the equilibrium face interest rate and share
of imprudent intermediaries in the uninformative case (i.e.,  = 1=2), which corresponds to
the baseline model analysed in the previous Sections (since in this situation both conditional
equity distributions coincide with the unconditional one, and we are back to the single-market
case.) Under our parameters specication, the (unique) face interest rate r is determined by
the following equilibrium condition:
2  r

1  1
2
g

r;
1
2

  1
2
=
1
2
; (33)
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where the left hand side is the aggregate demand for loanable funds and the right hand side
is the aggregate supply of loanable funds, w = 1=2. Using (25), we may then explicitly solve
for the expected return on loans, which is given by:


r;
1
2

= 1  :
By equation (25) again, the face interest rate must satisfy r (1  F (~e (r)) =2) = 1. Since
the unconditional CDF is F (e) = e and ~e (r) is given by (31), we get the equilibrium interest
rate r =
p
8=3 = 1:633; which in turns produces a share of imprudent intermediaries of
g

r;
1
2

= 2  3
4
r = 0:775 (34)
Informative signals. Werst note that even when  > 1=2 and markets are di¤erentiated,
by no-arbitrage and given lendersrisk neutrality, the expected return on loans in the two
markets must be identical, i.e., we must have g (rg; ) = b
 
rb; 
  ~  rg; rb; . Second,
by (25) this common expected rate of return satises
~
 
rg; rb; 

= r

1  1
2
g (r ; )

;  = b; g: (35)
Using (32) and (35), we may express the demand for loanable funds in market  as
Bd; (r ; ) = 2  ~  rg; rb;   E : (36)
The marginal density of the signal is Pr ( = h) = Pr ( = l) = 1=2), so that total equity is 
Eb + Eg

=2 = E while the total demand for loanable funds is (Bd; (r ; )+Bd; (r ; ))=2.
The latter must sum up to the aggregate supply of loanable funds w = 1=2; so from (36) we
get
~
 
rg; rb; 

= 1 = 
In can be shown (by contradiction) that for all  2 [1=2; 1) and  = b; g, we always
have ~e (r ) > 1=2, so the upper halves of the conditional cumulative distribution functions
in (29)(30) determine the shares of imprudent intermediaries in each market. This implies
that these shares are given by:
gb
 
rb; 

= F
 
~e
 
rb
 b; 
~e(r)>1=2
= 2   1 + 2 (1  )

2  3r
b
4

; (37)
gg (rg; ) = F ( ~e (rg)j g; )~e(r)>1=2 = 1  2 + 2

2  3r
g
4

: (38)
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Finally, in both markets we have  (r ; ) = r (1   g  rb;  =2). Using (37)(38), the
fact that  (r ; ) = 1;  = g; b and rearranging, we nd that
 
rb; rg

solve:
1 = rb

   1
2
+
3 (1  ) rs
4

; 1 = rg

1
2
   + 3
4
rs

:
Then, with
 
rb; rg

known, we may compute the shares of imprudent intermediaries in
each market from (37)(38), and that in the whole economy (gb
 
rb; 

+ gg (rg; ))=2:When
 = 1=2, we have rb = rg = r =
p
8=3 (the uninformative limit studied above.) As 
rises above  = 1=2 i.e., the signal becomes more and more informative, rb goes up and
rg goes down since low- versus high-equity intermediaries are more and more identied as
such. Figure 4 plots the two face interest rates as a function of ; as well as the shares of
imprudent intermediaries in the two markets and the implied proportion of such intermedi-
aries economywide. In this example, the more informative the signal, the higher the share of
imprudent intermediaries in the economy. To understand why this is the case, compare the
uninformative case ( = 1=2; r = 1:633 and g = 0:775) to the polar opposite ( ! 1=2.) Rel-
ative to the former, in the latter i) low-equity intermediaries (i.e., those for whom e < 1=2)
are perfectly identied as excess risk takers but are charged accordingly (i.e., r = 2, g = 1,
so that  = 2 (1  1=2) = 1:), and ii), high-equity intermediaries enjoy lower face interest
rates, which induces some of them to behave imprudently (while they would be prudent
when charged the high face rate that prevails in the uninformative case.)
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Figure 4. Face interest rates and shares of imprudent intermediaries in market  = b; g; as
a function of the precision of the signal, :
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6 Impact of capital requirements
In this section, we explore the e¤ect on systemic risk of imposing capital constraints on
intermediariesbehaviour. For tractability, we carry out our analysis under the same para-
metric specication as in the previous section (i.e., f (:) is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] ;
p = w = 1=2;  = 1, Rh1 = 4, and the supply of loanable funds is inelastic at w = 1=2.)
We consider two simple forms of capital ratios: a naïvecapital ratio based exclusively on
balance-sheet size, and a risk-based capital ratio that ties the stringency of the ratio to the
level of portfolio diversication achieved by the intermediary. As we show, the former may
turn out to raise than lower aggregate risk-taking, due to the impact of constrained rms on
the equilibrium interest rate. However, in our parametric example risk-based capital ratio
are e¤ective at curbing systemic risk (assuming that they are feasible.)
Asset size-based capital ratios. We rst consider the impact of a simple (naïve) capital
ratio prescribing that intermediaries must hold as initial equity at least some pre-specied
fraction  2 (0; 1) of total assets. That is, we impose
e  Pxi: (39)
The constraint (39) might be binding or not, depending on the equity level of each
individual intermediary. In order to keep the analysis concise, we focus on the (realistic)
case where  is (i) su¢ ciently high for (39) to be binding at least for some intermediaries,
given the equity distribution f(e); and (ii) su¢ ciently low for (39) not to be binding for
intermediaries that would spontaneously choose the prudent portfolio in the absence of a
capital constraint (essentially because those are su¢ ciently capitalised in the rst place.) In
short, we focus on the case where (39) may limit the leverage and investment of some (but
not necessarily all) of the intermediaries that would behave imprudently in the absence of
the constraint. Under our parametric equity distribution, this amounts to assuming that 
is positive but small.
We rst show that the constraint may be e¤ective at limiting the leverage of imprudent
intermediaries i.e., when (39) is binding, but not at inducing portfolio diversication by
those intermediaries. Second, we show that by limiting the leverage of low-equity interme-
diaries, the capital ratio exerts a downward pressure on the equilibrium face interest rate,
which induces some of the originally prudent intermediaries to become imprudent. In con-
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sequence, a capital ratio purely based on size may ultimately raise, rather than lowers, the
share of imprudent intermediaries in the economy.
Impact of the ratio on (low-equity) intermediaries. From (39), the leverage of an
intermediary facing a binding capital constraint is
b^ (e) = 
P
xi   e = e
 
 1   1 > 0: (40)
For low values of , (39) is potentially binding for low-equity intermediaries, i.e. those
who heavily resort on leverage in the absence of a capital constraint. As discussed above, we
focus on the case where  is su¢ ciently low for the constraint to be potentially binding only
for imprudent intermediaries. Under our parameters, in the absence of capital constraint
those imprudent intermediaries would choose a leverage of (see (19)):
b (r; e) = 2  1
2
r   e: (41)
The capital ratio is binding if and only if b^ (e) < b (r; e), that is, if and only if
e < 

2  1
2
r

 e^ (r;) :
On the liability side, an intermediary facing a binding capital constraint chooses a lower
level of leverage than it would otherwise. On the asset side, does the constraint alter its
portfolio choice? The answer is no. To see this, compare the values of a prudent and an
imprudent intermediary with total assets given by
P
xi = e= (i.e., the intermediary is
constrained.) From our analysis in Section 3 and under our parameters specication, the
former and the latter are given by, respectively
~V  (e) = re+
 e


(2  r)  c
 e


; ~V  (e) =
1
2

re+
 e


(4  r)

  c
 e


: (42)
Since ~V  (e) > ~V  (e), an intermediary facing a binding constraint always chooses the
imprudent portfolio (~x1; ~x2) = (e=; 0) :
Loanable funds equilibrium. Under our maintained assumption that  is small, we have
e^ (r) < ~e (r), so that the capital constraint may only be binding for originally imprudent
intermediaries. Then, the demand for loanable funds by the intermediary sector is given by:
Bd (r;) =
Z e^(r;)
0
b^ (e) dF (e) +
Z ~e(r)
e^(r;)
b (r; e) dF (e) +
Z 1
~e(r)
b (r; e) dF (e) :
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Using (40)(41), the fact that dF (e) = de and rearranging, we may rewrite the latter
expression as:
Bd (r;) =
3
2
  3
8
r2   
2

2  1
2
r
2
: (43)
The face interest rate that clears the market equates Bd (r;) with the aggregate supply
of funds, w = 1=2. When  = 0 (our baseline scenario), we again have r =
p
8=3 (the
solution to 3=2  3r2=8 = 1=2) and g (r; ) = 2  3r=4 = 0:775 (see equation (34) above.) As
 rises and constrains the leverage choices of more and more intermediaries, the aggregate
demand curve Bd (r; ) shifts down. Given the vertical loan supply curve Bs = 1=2, the
equilibrium face interest rate r must go down. Solving the equation Bd (r;) = 1=2 for r,
we indeed obtain the decreasing interest rate function
r () =
4
3 + 
 
+
r
3  5
2
!
: (44)
Finally, since intermediaries facing a binding capital constraint choose the imprudent
portfolio (~x1; ~x2) = (e=; 0), the share of imprudent intermediaries in the economy is given
by: Z ~e(r)
0
de = ~e (r ()) = 2  3
4
r () ;
which is increasing in . To summarise, simple capital ratios based on balance-sheet size
are (in our example) ine¤ective at limiting systemic risk. Quite on the contrary, by lowering
the equilibrium face interest rate, the capital constraint worsens the risk-taking channel and
induces imprudent behaviour by those intermediaries that would otherwise behave prudently.
Risk-based capital ratios One key reason for the ine¤ectiveness of simple capital ratios
is that even though the ratio does limit some of the intermediariesborrowing, it does not
curb their risk-taking incentives on the asset side. Suppose now that the regulator (but not
an outside lender) is able to observe the riskiness of intermediariesportfolio and to set the
capital ratio accordingly. For example, assume that the capital ratio e=
P
xi is  2 (0; 1)
for a prudent intermediary, but ~ >  for an imprudent intermediary. Incorporating this
risk-based capital ratios into the values of being prudent or imprudent in (42), we nd that
a constrained intermediary prefers to be prudent if and only if
re+
e

 
pRh1   r
  c e


> p

re+
e
~
 
Rh1   r
  c e
~

:
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A su¢ ciently large value of ~ (relative to ) acts as a deterrent and induces prudent
behaviour by constrained intermediaries, so that  rather than ~ e¤ectively applies. Under
this regulatory arrangement, the aggregate demand for loanable funds is as in (43), and
consequently the equilibrium face interest rate as in (44). However, since intermediaries
facing a binding constraint now behave prudently, the share of imprudent intermediaries in
the economy is nowZ ~e(r)
e^(r;)
de = ~e (r)  e^ (r; ) = 2  3r ()
4
  

2  1
2
r ()

;
where r () is given by (44). The latter expression is decreasing in , implying that a risk-
based capital requirement is e¤ective at reducing economywide risk-taking (again, within
our parametric example.)
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the portfolio and leverage choices of limited-liability inter-
mediaries and their implications for the level of aggregate risk and the way it responds to
changes in economic conditions. The novelty of our framework relative to earlier analysis of
intermediariesrisk-shifting behaviour is twofold. First, we emphasise the disciplining role
of shareholders inside equity stake and the heterogeneities that it implies for their equi-
librium balance sheets both on the asset and liability sides. Second, and relatedly, we
explicitly model changes in economywide risk-shifting along the extensive margini.e.,
due to changes in the number of intermediaries endogenously choosing to expose themselves
to the risk of default, in addition to the usual intensive margin i.e., related to changes in
their individual balance-sheet choices.
A important property of the models equilibrium is that it jointly determines the (com-
mon) borrowing rate faced by intermediaries and the level of aggregate risk in the economy,
due to the endogenous sorting of intermediaries along the equity dimension. Unsurprisingly,
intermediaries with low shareholdersstake are more likely to behave imprudently than those
with high inside equity stake. More interestingly, the sorting of intermediaries his itself af-
fected by the interest rate, with falling interest associated with a rising number of imprudent
intermediaries and aggregate risk. For this reason, exogenous factors that a¤ect the market
for loanable funds (e.g., international capital ows) have a direct impact on the level of risk
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generated by the nancial sector. Similarly, exogenous changes in the distribution of inter-
mediariescapital a¤ect the equilibrium interest rate, aggregate risk, and the return that
ultimate lenders can expect from entrusting the nancial sector with their funds.
While we have focused on two specic nancial fragility channels (the risk-taking channel
of low interest rates and the gambling-for-resurrection channel of falling equity), our model
could be elaborated further to analyse the impact on intermediaries risk taking of other
changes in macroeconomic conditions. For example, it is frequently argued that booms
are times of low risk aversion, thereby a¤ecting investorsportfolio choices (e.g., Bernanke
and Kuttner, 2005; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). Analysing the impact of changes in
risk aversion for intermediariesrisk taking would require departing from the risk neutral
assumption, with nontrivial implications for both intermediaries choices and the implied
aggregate welfare.
Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From (15), the best capitalised intermediary (i.e., that for whom
e = emax) has positive leverage if and only if the equilibrium interest rate is not to low, i.e.,
r < r = pRh1   emax=; were inequality i. not to hold, then no positive equilibrium interest
rate would satisfy this property. Moreover, B^s (r;w) > 0 provided that r > r = u0 (w) :
Hence, the relevant domain of r is (r; r), and we need r < r, that is, u0 (w) < pRh1   emax=:
For the two curves to cross, we need B^d (r;w) = 
 
pRh1   u0 (w)
   E > B^s (r;w) = 0 and
B^d (r;w) = emax   E < B^s (r;w) = w   u0 1
 
pRh1   emax=

: Assumption ii. ensures that
both are satised (and hence that r < r).
Proof of Lemma 2. As before we need r < r = pRh1   emax= for all intermediaries
(including the best capitalised amongst the prudent ones) to be leveraged, so inequality i. is
required for this to be possible at positive interest rate levels. Lending is positive whenever
Bs (r; ; w) = w   u0 1 () > 0, that is, using (25), whenever
 = r (1  (1  p) g (r; )) >  = u0 (w) :
Letting r0 solve r0 (1  (1  p) g (r0; )) = u0 (w), the relevant domain of r is now (r0; r),
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where r0 > r. For the two curves to cross, the following conditions must be satised:
Bd (r0; ) = 
 
pRh     E > Bs (r0; ; w) = w   u0 1   = 0;
Bd (r; ) = r (1  p) g ((r; ))  E < Bs (r; ; w) = w   u0 1 (r (1  (1  p) g (r; ))) :
Solving both conditions for w, we obtain:
w > u0 1
 
pRh   E= ;
w > r (1  p) g ((r; ))  E + u0 1 (r (1  (1  p) g (r; ))) ;
which is the second condition of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, substitute (25) into (24) so as to write (28) as follows:
Bs ( (r; ) ;w) +  (r; ) = pRh1   E: (45)
Total di¤erentiating (45) whilst holding  constant, we nd:
dr
dw
=   B
s
w ( (r; ) ; w)
 +Bs ( (r; ) ; w)

r (r; )
< 0; (46)
which in turn implies, by the properties of  (r; ) and g (r; ):
d (r; )
dw
= r (r; )
dr
dw
< 0;
dg (r; )
dw
= gr (r; )
dr
dw
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. Total di¤erentiating (45) again but now holding w rather than
 constant, we nd
dr
d
=  

 +Bs ( (r; ) ;w)

 (r; ) + E
 +Bs ( (r; ) ;w)

r (r; )
:
From (25), we have  (r; ) =  r (1  p) g (r; ) > 0 (i.e., an increase in  raises the
return on loans by inducing more intermediaries to adopt a prudent behaviour), while E =
@
@
R emax
0
ef (e; ) di  0. Hence, the numerator in the ratio is positive. Since the denominator
is also positive, we have dr=d < 0, i.e., a downward shift in the economywide equity base
raises the equilibrium interest rate (as intermediaries seek to substitute equity for debt).
The equilibrium share of imprudent intermediaries is g (r; ) ; and from above we have
dg (r; )
d
= gr (r; )
dr
d
+ g (r; ) : (47)
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The direct e¤ect of  on g (r; ), as measured by g (r; ) and holding r constant, is
negative i.e., a leftward shift in the distribution of equity raises the number of imprudent
banks. The ambiguity in the overall response of g (r; ) comes from the reaction of the
equilibrium interest rate. We have just seen that dr=d < 0, and we know from (22) that
gr (r; ), hence gr (r; ) dr=d > 0 i.e., a leftward shift in the distribution of equity raises the
aggregate demand for funds, which raises the interest rate and ultimately disciplines bank
behaviour.
The second part of the proposition can be established by continuity with the limiting
case, where Bs ( (r; ) ;w) is innitely elastic to changes in  (r; ). In this case,  (r; ) is
constant, so that total di¤erencing it and using (25), we obtain:
r (r; ) dr +  (r; ) d =
[1  (1  p) g (r; )  (1  p) rgr (r; )] dr   r (1  p) g (r; ) d = 0;
or
dr
d
=
rg (r; )
(1  p) 1   g (r; )  rgr (r; )
:
Finally, substituting this latter expression into (47) gives:
dg (r; )
d
=
g (r; )

(1  p) 1   g (r; )
(1  p) 1   g (r; )  rgr (r; )
:
Since g (r; ) < 0 while (1  p) 1 > 1  g (r; ), the numerator is necessarily negative.
By (26), the denominator is positive, so dg (r; ) =d < 0. By continuity, if the supply of
funds is su¢ ciently elastic then a leftward shift in the distribution of equity raises g (r; ) :
B. Isoelastic cost function
Our results in Sections 2 to 4 have been derived under the simplifying assumption that the
cost function is quadratic. We now show that most of our results (and, in particular, those
pertaining to the impact of aggregate shocks) do hold under the more general isoelastic case,
where the cost function takes the form:
c (
P
xi) =
(
P
xi)
1+
 (1 + )
; ;  > 0; (48)
where  indexes the elasticity of the cost with respect to the size of the balance sheet and 
a level parameter.
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Intermediariesbehaviour and value. From (9), under (48) the optimal portfolio of a
prudent intermediary with inside equity e is given by:
P
xi =
 

 
pRh1   r
1=
; b =
 

 
pRh1   r
1=   e: (49)
Given this balance-sheet structure, the value of a prudent intermediary is
V  (e) = re+ (
P
xi )
 
pRh1   r
  c (Pxi ) = re+  1=1 + 
 
pRh1   r
1+ 1
 :
Similarly, using (17) we nd the optimal portfolio of an imprudent intermediary under
(48) to be:
x1 =

p
 
Rh1   r
1=
; x2 = 0; b
 =

p
 
Rh1   r
1=   e; (50)
thereby giving the value
V  (e) = p
 
re+ x1
 
Rh1   r
  c (Pxi) = pre+  1=
1 + 
 
p
 
Rh1   r
1+ 1
 :
Equity threshold. An intermediary with inside equity e chooses the prudent investment
strategy if and only if V  (e)  V  (e), that is, if and only if
e  
1=
(1 + ) (1  p)
0@Rh1   pr1+ 1   Rh1   r 1+1
r
1A  ~e (r) :
The threshold ~e (r) is now a complicated function of r, but we show that it is strictly
decreasing in r for all  > 0, as in the baseline model with quadratic investment cost. From
the denition of ~e (r) in the latter inequality, we nd that ~e0 (r) < 0 if and only if 
Rh1   r
  
Rh1 + r

<
 
Rh1   pr
  
Rh1 + pr

: (51)
Let us now dene the function H :

0; Rh1
! R+ as follows:
H (x) =
 
Rh1   x
  
Rh1 + x

:
Since pr < r, a su¢ cient condition for (51) to hold for all  > 0 is that H 0 (x) < 0, or
equivalently that h0 (x) < 0; where h (x) = lnH (x) : We nd
h0 (x) =   1
Rh1   x
+

Rh1 + x
=   x (1 + ) 
Rh1   x
  
Rh1 + x
 < 0;
implying that ~e0 (r) < 0 for all  > 0.
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Loanable funds equilibrium. Integrating the demand for funds by all intermediaries as
in (24) but with b and b given by (49)(50), we obtain
Bd (r; ) =
Z ~e(r)
0
 

 
pRh1   r
1=   e dF (e; ) + Z emax
~e(r)

p
 
Rh1   r
1=   e dF (e; )
=
 

 
pRh1   r
 1
 g (r; ) +
 
p
 
Rh1   r
 1
 (1  g (r; ))  E
Bd (r; ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in r for all  > 0. Continuity is immediate
(given the assumption that f (e) is itself continuous). That Bd (r; ) is strictly decreasing in
r can be established as follows. First, both
 

 
pRh1   r
 1
 and
 
p
 
Rh1   r
 1
 are strictly
decreasing in r. Second, since g (r; ) = F (~e; ) is nondecreasing in ~e while ~e0 (r) < 0 (see
above), g (r; ) is nonincreasing in r while
 
p
 
Rh1   r

>
 

 
pRh1   r

. Under minimal
technical conditions similar to those in Lemma 2, there is a unique market-clearing face
interest rate r, given the loan supply curve Bs (r; ; w). Moreover, since g (r; ) has the same
properties in the general isoelastic case as in the quadratic case, the comparative statics
properties stated in Propositions 1 and 2 hold for any  > 0:
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